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IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
OF THE STAT'E O·F UTAH 
LAVERE KIDMAN, et ux, 
Pla.intiffs an.d Respondents, 
-vs.-
LA VINE H. WHITE, et al., 
Defendants and Appellaml. \ 
KEITH S. JONES, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
WILLIAM E. WADE, et ux, et al., 
Third Party Defendants. 
Case 
No. 9704 
BRIEF OF APP·ELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action on two contracts between William 
F. Wade and Erma M. Wade and Lavine H. White. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case is an appeal by the defendant, Lavine H. 
White, of two Summary J udgme·nts entered May 9, 1962, 
in Civil No. 127987 of the District Court of Salt Lake 
County. The first Summary Judgment was against the 
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defendant, Lavine H. White, in the amount of $4,568.07, 
together with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 
March 4, 1960, to May 1, 1962, and at 8% thereafter until 
paid, and attorney's fees of $714.68. This Summary 
Judgment was in favor of LaVere Kidman and Leah 
0. Kidman. The second Summary Judgment against the 
defendant, Lavine H. White, was in the amount of $550.00, 
together with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 
March 1, 1960, to May 1, 1962, and reasonable atton1ey's 
fees in the amount of $195.00, and reimbursement for any 
amounts Keith S. Jones is required to pay to LaVere 
Kidman as a result of this litigation. This Summary 
Judgment was in favor of Keith S. Jones. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A Conditional Sales Note was signed by Keith S. 
Jones on June 21, 1957, in which he promised to pay 
LaVere Kidman and Leah 0. Kidman $6,500.00, at $100.00 
a month, with interest at 6%. (R-4-6) This long and 
detailed Note contained an acceleration clause. There 
was also a p·rovision for attorney's fees if suit were 
brought to collect the Note. 
On ~I arch 31, 1959, l{eith S. Jones assigned this 
Conditional Sales Note to William F. ''"~"ade and Erma J\ti. 
Wade. (R-7-9) In the carefully prepared ... :\ssignment it 
was stated: 
''That the assignor in consideration of the pay-
ment of $10.00 and other good and valuable con-
sideration ... assigns to the assignees, all his right, 
title and interest in and to the aforesaid Condi-
tional Sale Note of June 21, 1957 ... 
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'' 3. That in consideration of the assignor execut-
ing- and delivering this agreement, the assignees 
covenant 'vith the assignor as follows: 
''A. That the assignees will duly keep, observe 
and perform all of the terms, conditions and pro-
visions of the said agreement that are to be kept, 
observed and performed by the assignor. 
''B. That the assignees will save and hold harm-
less the assignor of and from any and all aetions, 
suits, costs, damages, claims and demands "'"hatso-
ever arising by reason of an act or omission of the 
assignees.'' 
On February 4, 1961, vVilliam F. Wade and Erma l\I. 
Wade entered into an agreement "\Yith Lavine H. V\rhite, 
which reads as follows: (R-10) (The agreement in favor 
of Mr. Keith S. Jones is similar in all respects except 
amount. See R-19.) 
''In consideration of the transfer of all right, title 
and interest of William E. Wade and Erma M. 
Wade, his wife, in and to all personal property 
located at 3325 South 2300 East, Salt Lake County, 
Utah, I hereby agree to assume and pay off in full 
the .obligation of William E. Wade and Erma M. 
Wade, to "\Voodbury Corporation (Mr. LaVere 
Kidman) in the amount of $4,568.07 at the rate of 
$100.00 per month. /s/ Lavine vVhite. '' 
The original Conditional Sales Note came due and 
then delinquent, and Plaintiff to protect his interest 
brought this action against Jones, the \\r ades and White. 
The District Court in a pretrial hearing granted a nfotion 
for Summary Judgment and held all defendants liable on 
the original Conditional Sales Note. Third Party Plain-
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tiff Jones then moved in a Summary Judgment against 
the Wades and White. This was granted, Third Party 
Defendants being held liable for balance owing on Con-
ditional Sales Note, interest due, and attorney's fees, 
and on agreement running in favor of Mr. Keith S. Jones. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant contends that the Summary Judgment 
granted LaVere Kidman against Keith S. Jones, Wil-
liam F. Wade and Erma M. Wade, and the Summary 
Judgment granted Keith S. Jones against William F. 
Wade and Erma M. Wade was proper, but that the inclu-
sion of Lavine H. White in the Summary Judgment was 
sion of Lavine H. White in the Summary Judgments was 
improper. Appellant asks that the two Summary Judg-
ments be reversed, or that failing, a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY INTERPRETED 
A CONTRACT THAT WAS CLE.A.R AND UN-
AMBIGUOUS ON ITS F .A.CE TO I1fPOSE 
OBLIGATIONS NOT PRESENT IN IT. 
If a contract is clear and unambiguous it should be 
enforced according to its obvious import. Molyreu-s v. 
Twin Falls Canal Co., 54 Id. 619, 35 P. 2d 651, 94 A.L.R. 
1264, and we should not labor to dra'Y out a meaning not 
contained within the import of the contract. 
In the ease before the Court there is a contract to be 
construed. It is set out in the Statenlfnt of Facts in its 
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entirety 1, and the particular portion of the contract that 
ts in eontroversy says : 
''I here by agree to assume and pay off in full the 
obligation of William C. Wade and Erma l\{. 
Wade, to Woodbury Corporation (Mr. LaVere 
Kidman) in the amount of $4,568.07 at the rate of 
$100.00 per month. /s/ Lavine H. White.'' (R-10) 
The trial judge interpreted this contract to mean that 
Lavine H. White promised to pay the remaining portion 
of \vhat l{eith S. Jones owed LaVere Kidman, plus any 
interest owed on this amount, plus attorney's fees, if any 
litigation was necessary to collect this amount. The Court 
then further interpreted this contract to include an accel-
eration clause. The written contract above does not con-
tain any of these provisions, and it is submitted that the 
court erred in so interpreting it to contain them. 
The only possible ambiguity contained in this con-
tract is the word "obligation." However, this term was 
clearly defined by the parties themselves when they 
spelled out the obligation, i.e. "the obligation ... in the 
amount of $4,568.07 at the rate of $100.00 per month.'' 
If the parties had meant anything else it would have been 
easy for them to have said so. Both Jones and the Wades 
had entered into previous agreements regarding the same 
property in which attorney's fees, acceleration clauses 
and interest were mentioned. (See R-4-9) It would seem 
1 Note that all agreements concerning the ag.reement running in 
favor of LaVere Kidman also apply to the agreement running in 
favor of Keith S. Jones. For simplicity the first agreement is used 
throughout the brief to establish the argument which is applicable 
to both. 
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ridiculous for such sophisticated parties to ignore these 
clauses if they intended to be bound by them. If the pres-
ent agree-ment is interpreted to contain all the elments 
the lo,ver court finds it does, then no party 'viii ever be 
safe in making a contract unless he carefully studies all 
previous contracts regarding the same subject matter 
n1ade by the other party to determine if he is assuming 
any obligations not specifically mentioned in his particu-
lar agreement. Obviously this is a burden not intended 
by law to be placed on any contracting party. 
PoiNT II. 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED 
PAROL EVIDENCE TO CONTRADICT THE 
TERMS OF A WRITTEN AGR.EEMENT. 
The only logical way that the lower court could have 
reached its decision to include attorne-y's fees, an acceler-
ation clause and interest in this contract was to admit 
parol evidence to further define the word ''obligation.'' 
In the Findings of Fact the court explicitly states that 
defendant, Lavine H. White, assumed the Conditional 
Sales Note. (See R-27, 31) The court decided to admit 
the Conditional Sales Note between Kidman and Jones 
to define the "obligation" of White to the Wades to be 
the same as the agreement made between J(idman and 
Jones and the agreement bet"reen Jones and the \Vades. 
This was improp~er as a matter of law, because it change-d 
the written agree·ment. 
Williston in Williston On Con.fracts, Revised Edition, 
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Section 631, aptly discusses the dangers of admitting 
parol evidence in this regard by quoting Pollock, C. B. in 
the case of Nichol v. Godts, 10 Exch 191, 194: 
'' '~A- contract ... must be read according to what 
is written by the parties, for it is a well-kno\vn 
principle of law, that a \vritten contract c.annot he 
altered by parol. If A and B make a contract in 
\vriting, evidence is not admissible to show that _A 
meant something different from what is stated 
in the contract itself, and that B at the time assent-
ed to it. If that sort of evidence were admitted, 
every written document would be at the mercy 
of witnesses who might be called to swear some-
thing.'' 
In the present case there is no mere attempt to in-
crease the obligation of White - hut an attempt to con-
tradict the actual intended obligation and to put a ne\v 
one in its place. The word "obligation" once defined as 
$4,568.07 at the, rate of $100.00 a month in the contract 
(R-10) is redefined by the court in a manner that contra-
diets its original meaning. Chief Justice Fuller in Seitz 
Y. Brewer's Refrigerator Co., 141 U. S. 510, 12 S. C. 46, 
30 L. Ed. 83 said : 
" ... And 'vhen the writing itself upon its face is 
couched in such terms as impart a complete legal 
obligation without any uncertainty as to the object 
or extent of the engagement it is conclusively pre-
sumed that the whole engagement of the parties 
and the extent and maimer of their undertaking 
was reduced to writing.'' 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly taken the 
same position on this subject. See Groome v. Ogden C'·ify 
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Corp., 10 U. 54, 37 P. 90, 1894; McCall Co. v. Jennings, 26 
U. 459, 73 P. 639, 1903; McCornick v. Levy, 37 U. 134, 106 
P. 660, 1910. And it is submitted now that the obliga-
tion so clearly stated in the agreement cannot be changed 
by the court by using parol evidence to include some prior 
agreements made by other parties. 
PoiNT III. 
IF IT IS DETERMINED THAT THE CON-
TRACT IS NOT CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS 
ON ITS FACE, THEN THE COURT IMPROP-
ERLY GRANTED A SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
BECAUSE THERE WOULD THEN BE A 
BONA-FIDE CONFLICT ON A QUESTION OF 
FACT INVOLVING WHAT OBLIGATION 
LA VINE H. WHITE ASSUMED. 
A succinct statement regarding the propriety of a 
Summary Judgment when there is a question of fact is 
found in Moore's Federal Practice, Section 56.15, which 
states: 
''The function of the summary judgment is to 
avoid a useless trial; and a trial is not only not use-
less but absolutely necessary where there is a 
genuine issue as to any material fact. In ruling 
on a motion for a summary judgment the court's 
function is to determine whether such a genuine 
issue exists, not to resolve any existing factual 
issues.'' 
This entire case centeTs around the factual question of 
what obligation was assumed by Lavine H. White in her 
agreement dated February 4, 1961. The resolution of this 
bona-fide question of fact in a summary judgment is im-
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proper and should be left to a trial. Ulibarri v. Christen-
sen., 2 U 2d 367, 275 P. 2d 170, 1954. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Appellant respectfully submits that 
the two Summary Judgments be reversed in respect to 
Lavine H. White in the above-entitled action but if it is 
decided that a genuine question of fact exists then the case 
should be allowed to proceed to a trial for a determina-
tion of what obligation Lavine H. White owed the respec-
tive parties. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NIELSEN, CONDER AND HANSEN 
W. EuGENE HANSEN and 
FRANKLIN D. JoHNSON 
Newhouse Bldg. 
Salt Lake City 
Attorneys for 
Defendan-t-Appellant 
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